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Abstract 
This article develops a new theoretical framework for understanding consumer contract law, 
one based on competing ethics of self-interest/reliance and need. It shows how this is a 
better way of understanding choices as to levels of protection than the traditional ‘freedom 
versus fairness’ framework. The self-interest/reliance ethic favours rules allowing traders to 
use processes to escape responsibility for poor quality and harsh outcomes, while the need 
ethic is concerned with consumer weaknesses and better protects against such outcomes. 
The article also shows that need based rules are usually more effective at improving clarity 
and certainty, and where such rules cause uncertainty, at least as much uncertainty is 
caused by the alternative self-interest/reliance based rules. 
 
                                                     I INTRODUCTION  
This article considers how consumer contract law in the UK is influenced by alternative 
ethical visions of the ideal market order. There has been previous work, for example, on the 
relatively narrow question as to how competing judicial ethics affect interpretation of rules on 
standard terms and commercial practices-the rules being interpreted by some judges in 
ways that prioritise business self-interest and consumer self-reliance, and by other judges in 
ways that are more protective of consumers.1 This article is significantly more ambitious in 
scope. It focuses on a much larger part of consumer contract law: the legislative rules on 
conformity of goods, services and digital content (DC), and on unfair terms. It also asks a 
number of important new questions about the nature and significance of these ethics: What 
theoretical framework can explain these ethics? How does such a framework improve our 
understanding of different visions of consumer protection? How are these different visions 
reflected in the actual rules? These are the “ethics and protection” questions. Then there is 
the question as to how competing ethics affect legal clarity and certainty-the “ethics and 
clarity/certainty” question. The remainder of this Introduction explains how the answers to 
these questions are developed over the subsequent Parts of the article, and why these 
issues are so important.  
    The “ethics and protection” questions are dealt with over Parts II-IV. Part II proposes a 
new competing ethics framework and shows why this is a highly effective way of describing 
alternative visions of consumer protection. Under this framework, there is one ethical vision 
of consumer law which places strong emphasis on business self-interest/consumer self-
reliance. This would be expressed in rules providing limited consumer protection: allowing 
businesses to use their “inputs” or “processes”, to escape responsibility for poor quality 
outcomes, and to legitimise imposition of outcomes that are harsh on consumers. Towards 
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the other end of the ethical spectrum, is an ethic more sensitive to consumer “need”, i.e. the 
need for consumers to be protected due to their perceived weaker position. This would be 
expressed in rules that prioritise protecting consumers from poor quality and harsh 
“outcomes”. Part II argues that this is a more effective way of explaining consumer protection 
choices, than the “freedom versus fairness” framework previously used to explain consumer 
contract law. The “self-interest/reliance versus need” framework is more nuanced and 
precise. It makes a clear distinction between regulatory choices, while the distinction 
between “freedom” and “fairness” based options is often more blurred.   
    Parts III and IV use important recent reforms to show how the competing ethics of self-
interest/reliance and need play out in the actual consumer contract law regime: 
demonstrating that the regime reflects a tension between these competing visions of 
consumer protection. Recent years have seen various important reforms to business to 
consumer (B2C) contract law, e.g. on insurance, information and cancellation rights, and 
remedies for unfair practices.2 However, the Consumer Rights Act (CRA) 2015 is by far the 
most wide ranging and significant reform, and serves as the case study here on the “ethics 
and protection” questions. Parts 1 and 2 alone3 consolidate and reform B2C contract law 
rules affecting hundreds of millions of daily B2C contracts4: on conformity of goods, DC and 
services;  remedies for non-conformity; and unfair contract terms.5 Consistently high levels of 
consumer detriment are caused by defective goods, DC and services, and unfair contract 
terms.6 So, it is particularly important to understand how the legal response to this has been 
shaped by competing ethics. There has already been work on how the CRA and the other 
recent reforms have moved the B2C regime further from the values of business to business 
(B2B) contract law.7 However, this article digs more deeply, showing that the CRA actually 
contains rules reflecting a mixture of values: those reflecting the consumer need ethic, 
guaranteeing protection against poor quality and harsh outcomes; and those (less 
protective) rules reflecting the self-interest/reliance ethic, allowing businesses to use their 
‘inputs’ or ‘processes,’ to escape responsibility for poor quality outcomes, and to legitimise 
harsh outcomes.       
    Parts III and IV also use the CRA to show how competing ethics affect clarity and certainty 
(the “ethics and clarity/certainty” question). It is shown that need-based rules are usually 
better at improving clarity and certainty, than rules based on the self-interest/reliance ethic; 
and that where need-based rules do cause some uncertainty, at least as much uncertainty is 
caused by self-interest/reliance based rules. The remainder of this Introduction will explain 
why these issues are important and also provide a little more detail as to the arguments 
made about the relationship between ethics and clarity/certainty.    
    The CRA is an excellent case study on clarity and certainty. It had the specific policy aim 
to clarify the law, and thereby empower consumers to assert their rights and help businesses 
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and consumers to resolve disputes informally.8 This policy agenda was developed over a 
number of years,9 and it is very important. First, it connects to the consumer detriment issue: 
even if rules offer a reasonable level of protection on paper, consumers will not be 
empowered to enforce their rights (and detriment will not be reduced), if these rules are 
unclear and their application unpredictable. Second, if clearer more predictable law aids 
informal dispute resolution, this may save court time, and spare consumers and businesses 
the financial, time and emotional costs of litigation.10 Third, the recently implemented ADR 
Directive seeks to improve out of court dispute resolution, e.g. by setting quality 
requirements for ADR processes,11 but such processes involve significant input by parties 
with limited legal training, so the rules must be easy to find and apply.  
    Behavioural economics research shows that clearer law is not guaranteed to deliver these 
benefits. Whether consumers even use law to resolve problems depends on a range of 
factors: e.g. perceived risks and costs, consumer preferences and biases, and the design of 
the “choice architecture” (e.g. including websites mapping legal rights) that “nudges” 
consumers towards using law.12 Nevertheless, there is little point in nudging consumers 
towards legal rights, if these rights are confusing and uncertain: indeed this makes it harder 
to build a good choice architecture in the first place. So, clear law is at least a necessary part 
of any strategy that aims to empower consumers, and improve dispute resolution. 
    Prior to the CRA, B2C contract law was accepted to be unclear and uncertain:13 e.g. 
conformity standards, remedies and unfair terms rules spread over different legislation and 
the common law;14 inconsistent treatment of very similar transactions;15 and uncertainty as to 
what rules applied to DC.16 The key conformity standards, remedies and unfair terms rules 
are all now in the CRA,17 there is greater consistency across transaction types,18 and it is 
now clear what conformity standards and remedies apply to DC.19  
    Obviously various different factors affect legal clarity and certainty. For example, despite 
the CRA, clarity remains compromised by leaving too many rules “scattered around” 
elsewhere-e.g. the information and cancellation rights in the Consumer 
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Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations, and the remedies 
for unfair commercial practices in the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations.20 
However, the focus here is specifically on how clarity and certainty are affected by the 
ethical underpinnings of the rules. The argument, as stated above, will be that the rules 
reflecting the need-based ethic usually do more (or at least no less) to enhance clarity and 
certainty, than rules wired to the self-interest/reliance ethic. The classical position was that 
certainty in contract law is best achieved by enforcing what is agreed (no more, no less).21 
However, in his seminal work on Regulating Contracts, Collins argued that it may be 
important that the agreed terms can be supplemented and/or reviewed by reference to open 
textured standards. For Collins, these standards promote certainty because they are flexible 
enough to allow enforcement of what parties actually reasonably expect e.g. based on 
previous dealings and trade custom.22 Key to the argument made below here will be that the 
outcome-based rules favoured by the need ethic provide greater clarity and certainty 
because outcome-based rules are the norm for B2C relations and are therefore “reasonably 
expected” by the parties. So, like Collins, this article employs a “reasonable expectations” 
concept, but here it is a new reasonable expectations concept, based on the particularities of 
the B2C regime. The argument made here also goes beyond this, arguing that outcome 
(need) based rules often make dispute resolution more predictable (certain), when compared 
to the focus on business processes favoured by the self-interest/reliance ethic.              
       II Competing Ethics and Levels of Consumer Protection 
This section sets out the key features of the proposed competing ethics framework, and then 
explains how this framework provides an improved understanding of alternative consumer 
protection visions. The idea of competing ethics was first highlighted in relation to judicial 
approaches to general clauses on standard terms and commercial practices.23 The question 
here is how competing ethics might shape consumer protection choices in consumer 
contract law much more generally. The discussion focuses on legislative design of consumer 
contract law rules on conformity standards, remedies and unfair terms. Legislative design of 
such rules has not been covered in previous work, yet these rules are particularly important. 
It has already been noted just how much consumer detriment is caused by defective goods, 
services and DC and by unfair terms;24 and the law’s response to this is encapsulated in its 
choice of legislative rules on conformity of goods, services and DC, the remedies for breach 
of these conformity standards, and the rules on unfair terms. So, these rules really do lie at 
the very core of B2C contract law. In addition, these contract law rules on conformity, 
remedies and unfair terms, are strongly representative of consumer law more generally. This 
is because they also apply in the public enforcement sphere: where breaches of these 
contractual standards affect the collective interests of consumers, bodies such as the 
Competition and Markets Authority and local Trading Standards authorities can take action 
in the form of seeking undertakings and injunctions.25  
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    It has long been accepted that contract law is shaped by underlying values, although the 
appropriate choice of values has remained contested. Here one might mention debates as to 
the role of “reliance”, “expectation”, “promise”, “efficiency”, preservation of long term 
relationships etc.26 For our purposes, the most significant traditional dichotomy is that 
between ethical positions that support intervention in the relationship, to achieve what is 
often referred to as a “fair” balance in the parties’ interests; and on the other hand, ethical 
positions supporting what are often called “freedom of contract” values.27  
   In business to business (B2B) contract law, this dichotomy sometimes maps onto the 
distinction between late 20th century legislative interventions and traditional common law 
rules. While legislation such as the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 might be said to place 
controls on party freedom (by subjecting exemption clauses to a “fair and reasonable” test);28 
many B2B common law decisions might be said to reassert traditional freedom of contract 
values: e.g. by refusing to develop a general principle of “good faith” or by limiting the 
circumstances in which the penalty clause doctrine can set aside agreed damages 
clauses.29 As common law still plays a much bigger role in B2B contract law than legislation 
does, it could be said that “freedom” values still play a strong role in B2B contract law.  
    In B2C contract law, there has been significantly more legislative intervention than in B2B 
contract law, involving much greater deviation from what is traditionally labelled “freedom of 
contract”, much more focus on achieving what has been called “fairness”, than in any part of 
B2B contract law. For example, the consumer (the perceived weaker party) is protected by 
cancellation rights, which do not apply in B2B contracts;30 by non-excludable rights as to the 
quality of goods-such rights are excludable subject to a reasonableness test, in B2B 
contracts;31 and by controls over terms imposing unfair burdens on the consumer-in B2B 
contracts, there are only statutory controls over terms exempting liabilities.32 
    Indeed, Brownsword has argued that B2C contract law is no longer “contract” law at all-
there being insufficient choice as to the obligations undertaken to talk of a “contract” in the 
traditional sense-rather it is a form of regulation.33 However, it is one thing to say that there is 
regulation, not contract. The point here is to go beyond this: to show that there are 
alternative visions as to the degree of regulatory protection that should be provided to 
consumers. Now, some prior work has focused on the distinction between approaches 
influenced by values of fairness and values of freedom.34 However, in the subsequent 
paragraphs here it is argued that consumer contract law is better explained by a theoretical 
framework based on competing ethics of “self-interest/reliance versus need”. The idea is that 
there is a spectrum of ideological or ethical positions that might be taken in consumer 
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contract law. Towards one end of this spectrum, and overlapping with the values of B2B 
contract law, is an ethic of business self-interest and consumer self-reliance, which provides 
limited consumer protection. At the other end of the spectrum, is a more protective ethic, 
prioritising consumer need. Rather than thinking of B2C contract law as being all about 
“regulation” or “fairness”, or even being about a mixture of “freedom” and “fairness”, it is 
better to try to explain it by reference to these competing ethics of self- interest/reliance 
versus need.   
A. Business Self Interest/ Consumer Self-Reliance 
In the context of conformity standards, remedies and unfair terms, it is submitted that 
business self-interest and consumer self-reliance might be prioritised in the following ways:  
    The law can minimise the number of conformity standards applicable to businesses, and 
the remedies available for breach of such standards: so limiting the need for businesses to 
expend resources on providing remedies (damages, repair, repeat performance etc) to 
consumers. At the most extreme end of the spectrum here, there would be no mandatory 
conformity standards or remedies at all. This is resonant of the traditional “caveat emptor” 
doctrine, with an extremely high degree of self-reliance being required of consumers if they 
are to protect their interests: so if any standard at all is to apply to the business’ 
performance, consumers must either negotiate for the business to make some express 
commitment to this effect, find another business that will so commit, or they must insure 
against the risks.  
    Continuing with conformity standards and remedies, and still prioritising business self-
interest and consumer self-reliance (but not quite as much as above), the next hypothetical 
position that might be taken would be to hold that there should indeed be conformity 
standards and remedies, but that these should be designed to be as generous as possible to 
businesses. So, there could be a “fault” or “negligence” based, standard, which allows 
businesses to escape responsibility for defective outcomes, as long as they have exercised 
a reasonable standard of care in their input or procedure (i.e. in relation to the 
actions/omissions involved in the process of providing the goods, DC or services).35 Here, 
the need for self-reliance by consumers is not quite as vital as above-some protective norm 
applies, so there is at least the possibility of a remedy if the outcome is defective. However, 
if consumers wish to ensure they have a remedy should things go wrong, they must still 
exercise a fairly substantial degree of self-reliance. They must negotiate for the business to 
promise to take responsibility for a defective outcome (even where the process was carried 
out with reasonable care), or find another business who will agree to this, or insure against 
the risks. In the absence of such “opt-in” measures at the pre-contractual stage, consumers 
must, at the dispute stage, demonstrate a lack of reasonable care in the business’ process.  
    Turning to the unfair terms rules (i.e. the rules applicable to the terms-usually standard 
terms-used by businesses in contracts with consumers), it is submitted that these rules can 
also be designed in ways that promote business self-interest. Again the key is to focus on 
business procedures: e.g. allowing terms to be very substantively favourable to businesses 
(and harsh to consumers), so long as the business ensures (this not being especially 
onerous) that the terms satisfy “procedural” standards (e.g. clarity, prominence and other 
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forms of transparency). There is again a direct link with consumer self-reliance. If terms need 
only satisfy procedural standards, consumers who wish to protect their interests, must make 
a pre-contractual search for substantively harsh terms, then either bargain for their removal, 
insure against the risks or find a business who does not use such terms. If none of this is 
possible, other forms of self-reliance are required: consumers must either avoid any risks 
that lurk in these terms (e.g. if high charges are payable where the consumer acts in a 
particular way-such as inadvertently exceeding an agreed overdraft-the consumer must try 
to avoid such actions); or subsequently impugn the legal validity of the terms, by establishing 
a defect in the business’ procedures, e.g. that the terms are insufficiently transparent.36 
    Where consumer contract law reflects the “self-interest/reliance” ethic, there is a high 
degree of overlap with the values of B2B contract law, which, as indicated above, takes a 
broadly non-interventionist approach: e.g. limiting control over penalty clauses and 
eschewing a general principle of good faith.  
                                                             B. Need 
Moving along the ethical spectrum, it is submitted that it is possible to take a position more 
focussed on consumer need. The premise is that consumers are especially vulnerable to 
detriment, and require greater protection than is provided by the above procedural standards 
i.e. there should be much less emphasis on business self-interest and consumer self-
reliance.   
    The conception of consumer vulnerability has various facets. First, the idea is that if 
businesses suffer economic losses (e.g. due to the consumer’s breach) or do not make the 
gains they expect, they are often in a relatively strong position to absorb this e.g. through 
insurance, spreading losses across different divisions of the business, etc. By contrast, 
consumers, as private citizens, often have limited capacity to absorb economic losses 
caused by defective goods, services and DC, or detrimental terms.37 Also, for consumers, 
breaches of contract, detrimental terms, etc., may have a serious impact on the private 
sphere of life: so called “consumer surplus” effects e.g. loss of time, distress, inconvenience 
in personal lives, the frustration of obtaining no redress.38 Businesses are generally less 
likely to be affected in these ways.39 So, from a need-based perspective, account must be 
taken of the weaker position of consumers as loss bearers.    
    The above vulnerabilities relate to the adverse impact of poor quality and harsh outcomes. 
A further facet of the need-based conception of vulnerability is the perception that 
consumers struggle to exercise self-reliance to protect themselves from these detrimental 
outcomes. Various reasons can be cited for this. Lack of knowledge, expertise and 
experience are key factors here. Not being expert, “repeat players” in the business in 
question, consumers often have limited knowledge or understanding of the risks of products 
or services failing, or of the risks in standard terms.40 This may mean businesses are not 
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placed under sufficient competitive pressure to offer guarantees as to high quality outcomes 
and to provide standard terms that take account of consumer interests. Even if consumers 
are aware enough to seek to bargain for such outcomes, they will struggle to be successful. 
Individual consumers are not usually important enough to businesses to place them in a 
strong bargaining position. Also, because they are not repeat players when it comes to 
business negotiation, consumers often lack the sophistication and experience of 
businesses.41 This will usually place the consumer at a disadvantage when seeking to 
negotiate resolution of a dispute. This disadvantage will be  all the greater the more that the 
actual legal standards favour the business, e.g. where businesses escape responsibility for 
defective outcomes so long as they have exercised reasonable care in their processes, or 
are permitted to use terms detrimental to consumers so long as they make the terms 
transparent.  
    So, from a need-based perspective, paying attention to the above consumer 
vulnerabilities, a key priority of the law should be to protect consumers from detriment. What 
are the implications of this for rules on conformity standards, remedies and unfair terms?  
    Conformity standards should be strict liability in nature: businesses to be responsible for 
defective outcomes, even if they have exercised reasonable care in their procedures (as 
long as this would not overburden businesses, e.g. where achieving outcomes is too 
unpredictable). As indicated above, from a need-based perspective, poor quality outcomes 
are perceived to have a particularly harmful effect on consumers. In addition, consumers are 
considered to have limited knowledge, experience, skill and power, and so will find it very 
difficult (i) to win arguments (especially out of court) about whether businesses have 
exercised reasonable care in their processes (particularly, as we shall see below, where 
machinery or technology is involved); or (ii) to bargain at an earlier stage for businesses to 
voluntarily agree to guarantee that the outcome will not be defective.  
    Also, if guided by a need ethic, the remedies for breach of conformity standards should be 
designed to take account of consumer vulnerabilities. So, the remedies should prevent 
detriment being exacerbated at the dispute stage: and we shall see below that cure 
remedies may be more effective in this regard than damages.  
    As for the design of rules for contract terms, from a need-based perspective, it should not 
be sufficient for the terms to be transparently presented during the pre-contractual process. 
In addition, these terms - the outcome or result of the pre-contractual process - should not 
be substantively harsh on consumers. This again reflects the concern to ensure consumer 
protection against detrimental outcomes (here, substantively harsh terms), the idea being 
that this can rarely be achieved by self-reliant consumer action. The view from a need-based 
perspective would be that even if terms are transparent, this is of limited practical use in 
helping consumers to protect their interests. The need-based argument for this would run as 
follows: Pre-contractually, consumers will often not have time to read the ancillary terms; but 
will focus on “core” issues: the main goods, services or DC, the main price.42 Even if they 
read the standard terms, consumers will struggle (in particular due to limited experience) to 
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estimate how likely it is that the circumstances the terms deal with, will become relevant (e.g. 
as we shall see below at Section IV, it may be very hard to estimate whether contingent 
charges will become payable). This, in turn, makes it unlikely that consumers will make 
purchasing choices based on the standard terms, and consequently also unlikely that 
businesses will be forced to compete to offer terms that do not cause consumer detriment.43 
Being unaware of the existence of prejudicial terms, consumers will not typically insure 
against relevant risks, or bargain for removal of the terms - and anyway their weaker 
bargaining position would usually make such bargaining unsuccessful. If there is scope for 
consumers to take action to protect their interests later, e.g. avoiding high charges by 
staying within an agreed overdraft, they will often not do so due to understandable factors 
such as everyday pressures, forgetfulness etc. Finally, if a dispute arises, there is little 
consumers can do, if all the business need do to win, is show that the term is transparent.   
C. No claim as to the normative supremacy of either ethic  
The competing ethics of self-interest/reliance and need represent different visions of the 
ideal market order: of what best serves consumer, business and societal interests, and no 
claim is made here that one vision is “better” as such. Certainly, the need ethic aspires to set 
higher levels of protection, but this does not, per se, make it superior. One view is that the 
self-interest/reliance ethic is superior because it is less paternalistic, while it might be 
responded that a degree of paternalism is required to protect the (weaker) consumer. These 
alternative views of course do little more than reflect the basic values inherent in the 
respective ethics. Equally both ethics can find support in economic analysis. Classical 
economics tends to assume the less regulated choices favoured by the self-interest/reliance 
ethic to be rational and therefore  to produce efficient outcomes; while modern behavioural 
economics seriously doubts such assumptions of rationality  ̶  and therefore supports the 
notion that consumers often cannot be expected to exercise significant self-reliance.44                                         
    D. Beyond Freedom and Fairness 
While no claim is made that one of the ethics is normatively superior, what is claimed is that 
the “self-interest/reliance versus need” framework promoted here provides a much improved 
theoretical framework for consumer contract law. As indicated above, one way that contract 
law theory has previously explained regulatory choices is through a dichotomy of “freedom of 
contract” (basing rights and obligations on the agreement of the parties - no more, no less), 
and “fairness” (basing rights and obligations on balancing the interests of the parties).45 
Certainly in broad terms, the self-interest/reliance ethic might often be equated with freedom 
of contract (parties “free” to pursue their own interests and make self-reliant choices); while 
the need ethic might often be equated with fairness (it being arguably “fair” to balance the 
interests so as to protect the weaker party).  
    However, the self-interest/self-reliance versus need framework is arguably a more 
illuminating way of conceptualising the important regulatory choices: being more nuanced 
and precise (than a freedom versus fairness framework) as to the competing values and 
choices about levels of protection. First, “self-interest/reliance” is more determinate than the 
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notion of “freedom”. Rather than referring simply (and rather vaguely) to “freedom” (or the 
similar alternative, “autonomy”); the focus is specifically on business freedom (autonomy) to 
pursue self-interest, and consumer freedom (autonomy) to exercise self-reliance. This also 
draws a clear line between competing ethics. Self-interest/reliance cannot really be confused 
with the need ethic, yet “freedom” is sometimes understood to mean something similar to the 
need ethic: the argument being that information and bargaining weaknesses mean 
consumers have no “real” freedom, so when the law imposes outcome-based standards to 
protect consumers, it is actually imposing the standards consumers would choose if they 
were “really” free.46  
    The need ethic is linked to the sociological concept of “need rationality”47 and, as 
indicated, can be equated broadly with the notion of “fairness” as interest balancing: 
Protecting weaker parties (following the need ethic) can be viewed as the “fair” way to 
balance the parties’ interests. At the same time, the need ethic (like the fairness ethic) does 
actually balance interests: The need ethic may favour strict liability standards (to protect the 
consumer as weaker party), but these standards still take into account business interests. 
For example, the strict liability satisfactory quality standard applicable to goods and DC does 
not involve “absolute” liability, rather businesses can reduce the level of quality that is 
viewed as “satisfactory” by how they describe and price goods.48  
    However, these similarities notwithstanding, the need ethic is more nuanced and precise 
than the fairness concept. Whatever interest balancing may be done, it is very clear that the 
priority is consumer “need”, i.e. to protect consumers from the consequences of their 
vulnerabilities. In contrast, the more generic “fairness” concept does not make it sufficiently 
clear that the priority is to protect the consumer as the weaker party, and it allows scope for 
it to be argued that it is “fair” to prioritise business self-interest and consumer self-reliance. 
For example, the traditional distinction made between “procedural fairness” and “substantive 
fairness” arguably glosses over the difference emphasised here between self-
interest/reliance values of process/input based (“procedural”) standards and the more need-
based values of outcome-based (“substantive”) standards.49   
     
III Need-based Rules: High Level of Protection, Improving Clarity and Certainty 
This Part begins to show how the ethics of need and self-interest/reliance are reflected in the 
actual rules. It highlights rules that are underpinned by the need ethic and provide a 
reasonably high level of protection (while Part IV will highlight rules underpinned by the self-
interest/reliance ethic and setting a lower level of protection). This Part also begins to 
address the other key research question: how the competing ethics affect legal clarity and 
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certainty. It demonstrates a strong link between the need ethic and legal clarity and certainty.  
A. New DC Conformity Standards:  
The DC market is enormous and constantly expanding. Even in 2012, 40% of home internet 
connections were used for playing games and downloading music or video.50 Yet, prior to 
the CRA, there was enormous confusion as to what conformity standards applied to DC. 
There have long existed outcome-based (strict liability) terms as to quality, fitness etc in 
contracts for the supply of goods.51 Prior to the CRA, where DC was supplied on a tangible 
medium, it could (although this was not completely clear) be classified as goods, and 
therefore be covered by these terms.52 However, where there was no tangible medium, it 
was unclear whether the contract was “sui generis”, containing a common law implied 
(outcome-based) term of reasonable fitness for purpose;53 or a contract for services,54 in 
which case there would be a statutory implied term of reasonable care and skill (a fault 
standard).55 There is evidence that quality problems with DC cause significant consumer 
detriment;56 and apparently this confusion was a real obstacle to consumer redress.57  
    The CRA addresses this problem. Where data is “produced and supplied in digital form” 
(i.e. no tangible medium), this is classed as a distinct type of contract for “DC”,58 and in such 
contracts (following the approach in goods contracts) the CRA imposes (strict liability, 
outcome-based) terms on quality, fitness for purpose, description and right to supply.59 
These new rules are underpinned by a need-based ethic, and will normally result in a 
reasonably high level of consumer protection. The focus is on whether there has been a 
defective outcome (DC of poor quality, not fit for purpose etc). Sellers cannot escape 
responsibility based on their procedures, i.e. based on having exercised reasonable care in 
the selection or supply of the DC.60 If a reasonable care (fault) based standard had been 
chosen, sellers would have escaped responsibility on this basis: typically not being liable 
where standard business practice had been followed. 61 This would have set a low level of 
consumer protection, given that (as with goods) there is often a producer, who supplies the 
DC under a contract to a retailer, who subsequently sells under a separate contract to the 
consumer. Just as with goods, faults in DC usually emanate from the production process, 
but retailers cannot be expected to open and check DC before selling it to consumers, and 
even if they did check it, faults are often latent, i.e. not obvious to the retailer. So, it would 
often be very difficult to show that the retailer had not acted with reasonable care. With the 
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chosen outcome-based standards, there is a breach (and a remedy), so long as it can be 
shown that the DC is defective in terms of quality, fitness etc.  
        These reforms demonstrate the need ethic in action, setting a high level of protection, 
with outcome-based conformity standards. However, the reforms are also vital in helping to 
answer the question as to the relationship between competing ethics and legal certainty and 
clarity. The need-based DC regime contributes strongly to the CRA’s clarification policy goal: 
enhancing certainty and predictability and reducing complexity. First, there is improved 
certainty because it is now clear exactly what standards apply. Behavioural science research 
demonstrates the importance of clear “choice architecture” in influencing consumer 
behaviour,62 and this obviously includes clarity as to what the rules actually are. Second, the 
need-based regime arguably enhances clarity and certainty by creating greater consistency 
and therefore better reflecting the parties’ reasonable expectations. The point is that the DC 
regime is now consistent with the regime for goods contracts, i.e. the same (outcome-based) 
standards apply. Now, one might argue that to achieve clarity and certainty, all that matters 
is that rules are expressed clearly and can be applied in a predictable way. However, clear 
expression and predictable application notwithstanding, there is arguably unnecessary 
complexity and confusion if two very similar transactions are regulated by conceptually 
different rules. Indeed, consumers and businesses may expect goods and DC (which are 
likely to appear very similar to the parties, both often mass produced, and both often 
supplied together) to be subject to similar standards.63 If different standards apply, this fails 
to reflect reasonable expectations-causing confusion and undermining the clarity of the 
“choice architecture” that behavioural science indicates is important to empowering 
consumers to enforce rights.64 Collins has already used the idea of reasonable expectations 
to challenge the traditional view that simply enforcing what is agreed is the best way to foster 
certainty. He showed that open textured supplementation and review standards may 
promote certainty by providing the flexibility to enforce what parties actually reasonably 
expect, based on the long term business relationship, customs and making the deal work for 
both parties.65 Here, the “reasonable expectations” concept is developed in another way, to 
support the argument that in B2C relations, the need ethic may foster clarity and certainty: 
the case (to recap) being that the DC need-based rules focus on outcomes, that this is the 
norm for similar transactions (i.e. goods) and is therefore what is “reasonably expected” by 
the parties, which in turn makes the regime clearer and more certain for the parties.  
    Finally, the outcome-based standards provide certainty, because it is normally reasonably 
predictable how they will apply to a dispute. The focus is on the final state of the DC 
received by the consumer. Especially with new DC, it should usually be reasonably clear 
whether it is of satisfactory quality, fit for purpose, etc. The importance of this should not be 
underestimated when it comes to empowering consumers to utilise their legal rights. Recent 
behavioural science work emphasises that consumers are loss averse and that perceived 
costs and risks (increased by unpredictable standards) reduce the likelihood that they will 
make use of law.66 Compared to the chosen outcome-based standards, a fault standard 
often involves much more complex arguments, e.g. as to what quality control processes 
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were set up and followed (or not) by the supplier: making it harder to predict the result in any 
given case (see Part IV below). 
    The DC example is an excellent illustration of need-based rules improving protection, and 
it also demonstrates the strong link between the need ethic and clarity/certainty. We now 
turn to important (need-based) remedies that also improve protection, clarity and certainty.   
B. Cure Remedies 
For over a decade, in sale and work and materials contracts, consumers have had remedies 
of free repair or replacement of non-conforming goods: introduced to implement the Sale of 
Consumer Goods Directive (SCGD).67 The CRA extends these remedies to hire, hire 
purchase (HP) and DC contracts, where the goods or DC do not conform, e.g. where they 
are in breach of the terms as to quality, fitness etc, or express terms.68 “Repair” means 
bringing the goods or DC into conformity with the contract;69 "replacement" is not defined, 
but clearly involves replacement of the overall thing bought-new car, download, app etc.  
    The CRA also introduces a cure remedy in services contracts, providing that where the 
service does not conform, the consumer can demand free repeat performance to bring the 
service into conformity.70 A service does not conform when there is breach of the s. 49 term, 
which requires the service to be carried out with reasonable care and skill, or of a term 
arising under s. 50 (based on pre-contractual information provided by the supplier).71 
       These cure remedies are available in most cases. While the supplier can refuse to 
repair or replace goods or DC, or to repeat perform a service, if the requested remedy is 
impossible,72 this will be relatively rare. Goods or DC might be beyond repair, but then 
normally a replacement will be possible, unless the item is unique; while most services can 
be repeated. Repair of goods or DC can be refused if it is disproportionately expensive 
compared to replacement, and vice versa,73 but this “disproportionality” test does not apply 
to one cure remedy if the other one is impossible.74 Even when the disproportionality test 
does apply, and one cure remedy is found to be disproportionately expensive compared to 
the other, this other cure remedy is available, even if it is itself quite expensive: there is no 
provision allowing the business to refuse repair or replacement on the grounds that it is 
disproportionately expensive compared to price reduction, refund or some other remedy. 
(Such a comparison was allowed under the previous regime, but this was an incorrect 
implementation of the SCGD.75) Therefore, with goods and DC, consumers are always 
entitled to one of the two cure remedies, as long as they are not both impossible. With 
services, there is no proportionality defence at all, so repeat performance is guaranteed, 
unless impossible. Of course, ultimately cure can only be enforced by an order of specific 
performance (SP), and the court powers provision arguably allows a degree of discretion, 
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providing that the court “may” (not “must” or “will”) award SP.76 However, this is surely not 
intended to allow courts to take the traditionally very restrictive approach to SP-routinely 
refusing it and viewing damages as an adequate alternative.77 Such an approach would 
undermine the whole point of including cure remedies, and probably also fail to implement 
art 3 of the SCGD, which generally requires repair and replacement to be provided in sales 
contracts, as long as the impossibility and disproportionality “defences” do not apply.78 So, 
SP can probably only be refused in extreme cases: i.e. where the non-conformities are minor 
and SP would involve extreme costs or time commitments for the business.79 
    The routine availability of cure is a fundamental change for English contract law.               
Damages have traditionally been the primary remedy for breach.80 SP was always 
theoretically available as a remedy to support non-performance of the primary obligations. 
However, as indicated above, SP was never routinely granted, the key justification being that 
damages offer an “adequate” substitute:81 that the party affected by the breach can obtain 
cure from a third party and recover damages (from the breaching party) to cover the cost of 
this cure. Yet, from a need-based perspective, this is often not adequate at all.  
    Certainly consumers may often be content to obtain cure from a third party, but 
sometimes this may cause significant consumer detriment, and generate undesirable legal 
and practical complexities. First, there is the time, inconvenience and expense involved in 
finding and paying a third party to cure the breach: and payment may be a particular problem 
with expensive services such as building, especially as the consumer has already paid the 
original supplier. Then, once the third party has effected cure, the consumer must return to 
the original supplier, and potentially face arguments about how much of what has been paid 
to the third party can be recovered in damages: there may, e.g. be legal arguments as to 
whether the consumer has paid too much to the third party and thereby failed to mitigate his 
losses. Also, third party involvement could generate arguments about causation, e.g. where 
the third party makes things worse.82 All of these problems will be greater with complex and 
expensive goods, DC or services (e.g. building): adding to the detriment already caused by 
the breach, potentially meaning further inconvenience and economic detriment. 
    The cure remedies protect consumers from these problems and provide a further example 
of the need ethic in action. However, the cure remedies also further emphasise the link 
between the need ethic and clarity/certainty. First, as with the DC reforms, the need-based 
cure regime improves clarity and certainty by improving consistency between similar 
transactions and arguably therefore better reflecting the parties’ reasonable expectations. It 
is less confusing if there is a common set of cure remedies, whatever the precise nature of 
the supply of goods contract, and also for DC and services. It is complex and confusing if (as 
was the case prior to the CRA) consumers have cure remedies against those who sell goods 
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or supply them under a work and materials contract, but not against other suppliers of goods 
or DC, or against service suppliers. Whether the transaction is technically sale, work and 
materials, hire or HP, (defective) goods have been supplied. DC will appear very similar to 
most-often being mass produced just like goods, and being supplied along with or in close 
proximity to, goods, e.g. the supply of a phone, followed by software such as an app. 
Services will also often be supplied along with goods, e.g. car repairs which involve the 
supply of parts. It may well be contrary to the parties’ reasonable expectations and 
confusing, if transactions that appear very similar and that often occur together are in fact 
regulated by different standards.83 This conclusion is supported by the behavioural science 
research demonstrating the importance of good choice architecture.84  
    Second, as with the new DC conformity standards,85 the cure remedies provide greater 
certainty in the form of greater predictability. If consumers use these remedies against the 
original supplier, this avoids the abovementioned complex and unpredictable disputes that 
may arise if consumers must rely on cure by third parties. 
    So, similarly to the DC conformity standards, the need-based cure remedies improve 
protection, and they further demonstrate the link between the need ethic and certainty/clarity.  
      D  Beyond Freedom and Fairness 
The DC and cure examples also confirm that the competing ethics framework is more 
nuanced and precise than the traditional “freedom versus fairness” framework, in highlighting 
the values involved. When first explained above, the need ethic was shown to be concerned 
with protecting consumers from their vulnerabilities. Here we have seen this manifest, e.g., 
in cure remedies, which protect consumers from the inconvenience, expense and complex 
arguments that the “third party cure/damages” option may involve, recognising that 
consumers need this protection due to their more limited bargaining power, experience and 
loss bearing abilities. By contrast, it is not so obvious that the more general “fairness as 
interest balancing” ethic would take this approach. It might do. It could be said to be “fair” to 
recognise consumer vulnerabilities in the way the cure remedies do. But “fairness” is vague 
and can be understood in different ways. It might be argued to be “fair” to place more 
emphasis on business self-interest, making it “fair” for breaching businesses to refuse to 
cure, this being more efficient and convenient for them. On the consumer side, it might be 
argued that the theoretical availability of cost of cure damages is “fair”, or as the orthodox 
position has it, “adequate” for consumers, i.e. “fairness” elides with the opportunity for 
consumers to exercise self-reliance to recover damages.  
IV Self-Interest/Reliance Based Rules: Lower Level of Protection, Hindering 
Clarity and Certainty 
This section highlights the ethical tension at the heart of consumer contract law: showing 
how (in contrast to the above DC and cure rules) the CRA also contains rules underpinned 
by the self-interest/reliance ethic and providing less protection. It also shows that when it 
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comes to achieving clarity/certainty, the self-interest/reliance based rules are either worse, or 
at least no better than, the need-based alternatives.   
                            A. Retention of the Fault Standard for All Services 
In the services sector, poor performance causes considerable consumer detriment. In the 
year to April 2011 the government’s Consumer Direct Helpline received 70,000 complaints 
about building and home improvement contracts alone, with very significant attendant 
financial detriment, distress and inconvenience, while in one quarter alone of 2014-15, 
Citizens Advice Bureaux received 14,535 enquiries on home improvement contracts86  
    It was shown above that the new repeat performance remedy for services is inspired by 
the need ethic. However, consumers can only access this remedy if there is a breach of the 
relevant conformity standard, so all is dependent on what this standard is and how easy or 
hard it is to establish a breach of it. The previous regime contained an implied term that a 
business must carry out a service with reasonable care and skill.87 This covered (i) “pure” 
services, e.g. advice, education, etc;88 and (ii) services applied to property or DC already 
owned by the consumer, e.g. repair, cleaning, storage of goods, cloud storage of DC.89  
   Prior to the CRA, there was a proposal to apply a “satisfactory quality” standard to this 
second category of services.90 While it was the service (the business’ input) that was to have 
been of satisfactory quality, key to assessing this would have been the “outcome” of the 
service, i.e. the condition of the goods or DC after services like repair, cleaning or storage.91 
    Ultimately, the decision was taken to retain the reasonable care (negligence based) 
standard for all services and this rule is copied over into the CRA from the SGSA.92 It was 
argued by some businesses, and accepted by the government, that services are too 
intangible, complex and subjective to allow measurement of whether an outcome is of 
“satisfactory quality”.93 This may be true in relation to ‘pure’ services. So, with education, 
what is the ‘outcome’?  The materials provided? How they are explained?  Both? How 
students translate this into exam performance?  
    Yet, with services related to consumer property and DC, there is an obvious tangible 
outcome that can be assessed: i.e. the final state of the goods/DC, after the service is 
carried out. There are also objectively verifiable ways of measuring quality: whether the 
goods or DC have been damaged while being stored, whether they have been reasonably 
well repaired, cleaned, etc. Certainly, consumers may have differing, subjective, 
expectations on such issues, but the same is true of goods, and outcome-based quality 
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standards have long been effectively used in this context.94 This is managed by applying 
both objective criteria (what “a reasonable person” regards as satisfactory, taking into 
account fitness for common purposes, etc.), and subjective expectations, those raised e.g. 
by the “description” or the “price”.95 These same criteria were contained in the proposed 
outcome-based standard for services related to consumer property/DC.96 Finally, addressing 
the argument as to complexity, it is not significantly more complex to apply these criteria to 
the condition of goods/DC after a service, than to apply them to goods or DC supplied by the 
business-especially as goods supplied by the business are often second hand goods (cars 
being the classic example), where account must be taken of such varied factors as the age 
of the goods, the price paid, description given etc.    
        Arguably, then, the proposed outcome-based standard would have been perfectly 
workable.97 The chosen negligence-based standard certainly reflects the self-
interest/reliance ethic. It is not enough for consumers to establish a defective outcome. The 
business usually escapes responsibility unless the consumer demonstrates that the 
business’ processes did not follow standard business practice.98 Yet, from a need-based 
perspective, this expects very significant consumer self-reliance, given their limited 
knowledge and experience of such matters, and their limited bargaining expertise and 
power. The other option is for consumers to exercise earlier self-reliance and to persuade 
the business pre-contractually either to make an express contractual promise to achieve a 
satisfactory outcome, or even to make the less formal commitments that might lead a court 
to find a common law implied term of fact that the outcome will be reasonably fit for 
purpose.99 From a need-based perspective, it is unrealistic to expect consumers to extract 
such commitments, given their limited knowledge, experience and bargaining strength. 
Overall then, the fault standard provides limited consumer protection. Where consumers 
cannot establish fault in the business’ process, potentially high levels of consumer economic 
detriment will go un-remedied; particularly with high economic value contracts for services 
related to consumer property, e.g. home improvement.100 There may also be significant 
consumer surplus losses, e.g. the upheaval and stress when homes cannot be used 
normally due to poor home improvement work. The proposed outcome-based standard was 
grounded in the need ethic, and more likely to ensure consumer protection. Under this 
standard, there would normally be a breach (and a remedy) where the outcome is defective: 
e.g. if goods are damaged after repair or storage, if a house extension is defective.  
    The chosen input/process based standard also undermines clarity and certainty. First, 
there is the complexity and possible confusion caused by differing standards for goods/DC 
on the one hand (outcome-based), and services on the other (input/process based). As 
already discussed above, the existence of different standards increases complexity and 
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complicates the “choice architecture” consumers.101 Things are particularly confusing and 
contrary to reasonable expectations where services are supplied along with goods or DC, 
e.g. brake-pads supplied and fitted as part of a car service. Here the consumer finds that the 
business is strictly responsible if the brake-pads are defective, but only liable on proof of 
negligence if the car is damaged by the repair.102  
    So, just as need-based DC rules and cure remedies are more conducive to clarity and 
certainty because they create greater consistency and reflect reasonable expectations 
(above), we find here that self-interest/reliance-based rules compromise clarity/certainty by 
causing inconsistency and undermining reasonable expectations. However, there is a 
second point. Just as need-oriented DC and cure rules foster clarity/certainty by being 
predictable in their application (above), the opposite appears to be the case with some rules 
grounded in the ethic of self-interest/reliance. The input /process (negligence) based 
standard for services may cause complex disputes with unpredictable results, especially 
where services involve machinery or technology: as is common with services applied to 
consumer property or DC, e.g. car repairs, home improvement and internet services.103 The 
business may argue that some such factor has caused the unsatisfactory outcome: e.g. the 
car engine problem not diagnosed due to the defective testing machinery. A process based 
standard considers whether the business has followed standard business practice in terms 
of checks, tests etc. on the machinery or technology. Suppliers may produce a ’paper trail’ 
showing that all generally accepted procedures were followed. It may be very time 
consuming and difficult for consumers to contest such defences. This may make it 
particularly difficult to resolve matters efficiently out of court; and the outcome of the dispute-
whether in or out of court - may be hard to predict. As noted several times above,104 
behavioural research shows that perceived costs and risks (increased by complex and 
unpredictable standards) reduce the likelihood that consumers will rely on their legal rights. It 
would entirely miss the point to respond that consumers may benefit from reversal of the 
burden of proof under the res ipsa loquitur (RIL) doctrine: the defective outcome leading the 
court to infer negligence in the business’ process. The whole point of the CRA’s clarity policy 
agenda is to empower consumers to enforce rights and obtain redress out of court,105 where 
RIL will not help.  
        The proposed (need-based) standard would have avoided complex arguments about 
negligence. The focus is not on business processes, but simply on the quality of the 
outcome received- whether, e.g., goods are reasonably well repaired, cleaned etc; whether 
DC is damaged or lost during cloud storage.  
    The approach to the services conformity standard shows the ethical tension running 
through consumer contract law, and the consequences for protection and clarity/certainty. 
Here, in contrast to the DC and cure rules, the ethic is one of self-interest/reliance: producing 
a low level of protection and also undermining clarity/certainty. We now turn to another 
example of this.      
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          B. The price term exemption 
CRA Part 2 contains the unfair contract terms regime, unifying the previously overlapping 
regimes from UCTA and UTCCR.106 The new regime does add new protections: individually 
negotiated terms are now covered by the test of unfairness,107 and even if the parties have 
not raised the issue, courts must now review the fairness of a term if they have the 
appropriate factual and legal material.108 However, the focus here is on the choice made 
under the CRA to interpret the “price exemption” broadly: this reflecting the self-
interest/reliance ethic, limiting consumer protection against non-essential charges, and 
undermining clarity/certainty.  
    Now, before proceeding further, one key clarification should be made. The CRA uses the 
language of “fairness” (i.e. the test of “fairness” from which price terms are exempt109), yet 
this should not distract from, or be taken to contradict, a key argument running through this 
article, i.e. that when thinking of an underlying ethic that favours rules setting a higher level 
of protection, “need” is a preferable theoretical label than “fairness”. It just so happens in this 
case that following a need ethic would involve subjecting a broader range of charges to what 
is formally known as a “fairness” test: The point is that although the fairness test can itself be 
interpreted in either need oriented or self-interest/reliance oriented ways,110 if charges are 
subject to this test, there is at least the possibility of a need-oriented interpretation of the test 
and therefore a need-based review of the charges. Now, to the core point here: as to the 
exemption of charges from this (potentially need-oriented) fairness test.   
    The CRA provides that, if a term is “transparent and prominent”, it cannot be assessed for 
fairness if “the assessment is of the appropriateness of the price payable under the contract 
by comparison with the goods, digital content or services supplied under it”.’111 This derives 
from art 4 (2) of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive (UTCCD),112 included to 
leave a degree of scope for freedom of contract,113 and previously enacted in the UTCCR 
1999, Regulation 6 (2). Article 4 (2) UTCCD refers to the “adequacy” of the price (as did the 
UTCCR), but “appropriateness” apparently conveys the same idea, and must anyway be 
interpreted to mean the same thing while the UK remains in the EU. The idea is that 
(assuming the requisite transparency and prominence,114 discussed further below), the test 
of fairness cannot be used to assess whether the price is too high, given what is received in 
return (not precluding other types of fairness assessment, e.g. as to time of payment, or the 
right to vary the price). As the UTCCD is a minimum harmonisation Directive,115 Member 
States may provide a higher level of consumer protection, so the UK could have applied the 
test of unfairness to the price, but chose not to. However it is not this basic choice that 
concerns us here: rather, as indicated already, the particularly broad interpretation of ‘price.’  
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    There is little doubt that the “price” includes the basic charges payable for the core goods, 
DC or services; and there is sometimes justification for such charges not to be reviewed for 
fairness, given that (so long as the market is competitive), they are subject to competitive 
discipline.116 But what about other charges, e.g. those not routinely payable but which are 
contingent on some later (usually inadvertent) consumer act or omission: e.g. charges when 
consumers accidentally exceed an airline baggage allowance, or an agreed overdraft limit? 
To understand the CRA’s approach to which charges count as the price, it is necessary to 
review how ‘price’ was interpreted under the UTCCR regime preceding the CRA. The key 
case is Abbey National, which dealt with terms providing for large bank charges to be made, 
e.g., where consumers exceeded agreed overdraft facilities.117 Under the terms, exceeding 
the overdraft facilities was not defined as a default or breach, but as the consumer choosing 
to be provided with a service. Following this logic, the obligation to pay the charge was not 
defined as compensation for the bank’s loss; but as a charge for the bank’s service, i.e. the 
‘service’ of allowing the payment to be made from the account.  
    The Court of Appeal (CA) held that the “price” only covered charges that the typical 
consumer would consider ‘essential’ to the bargain; this not including charges for an 
unauthorised overdraft, which consumers would not have planned to take when first entering 
the contract: not being the “price”, the substantive fairness of these charges could be 
assessed under the test of unfairness.118 This was overruled by the SC, which refused to 
distinguish between essential and non-essential charges; holding that identifying the “price” 
was “a matter of objective interpretation by the court”.119 The SC accepted that charges 
flowing from consumer default were not the “price”,120 but found that the charges under 
consideration were not default charges. Rather the SC accepted the manner in which the 
terms themselves described the situation, i.e. that the charges were payable for services; 
concluding that such charges counted as the “price”, notwithstanding that they were not 
routine contractual payments, but were contingent on later consumer acts or omissions.121  
    The CRA’s unfair terms regime is based mainly on work by the Law Commissions.122 The 
general thrust of the Law Commissions’ analysis was that where charges are provided in 
exchange for a service, then even if this is contingent on some later inadvertent act or 
omission,123 such charges should (following the SC approach in Abbey) be treated as the 
“price”; albeit that they should only be excluded from the fairness assessment where they 
are both “transparent” and “prominent”.124 The CRA apparently follows this approach. It 
repeats the reference to “price”, and simply adds the transparency and prominence 
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conditions.125 This suggests that the intention is that any charge is the “price”, even where 
neither the charge, nor the “service” it pays for, is “essential” to the contract, e.g. where the 
charge is contingent on post-contractual acts or omissions. If the intention was for only 
essential charges to count as the price, this would surely have been indicated expressly.  
    This very broad approach to the price exclusion is another manifestation of the CRA being 
influenced by the self-interest/reliance ethic. It enables businesses to impose high non-
essential charges (exempt from any substantive fairness review) so long as they (i) define 
these charges such that they are accepted by the court to be for a service, and (ii) present 
them transparently and prominently. This places high expectations of self-reliance on 
consumers. Pre-contractually, they must take advantage of the transparency and 
prominence of any harsh non-essential charges that could come into play, consider what risk 
these pose; and if the risk is unacceptable, either try to bargain for their removal, or find 
another business who does not impose such charges. If none of this is possible, consumers 
must then take care not to do anything to trigger the charge (e.g. inadvertently go 
overdrawn, accidentally exceed an airline baggage allowance etc.).  
    From a need-based perspective, consumers have limited ability to take any of these forms 
of self-reliant action. Certainly the “prominence” and “transparency” conditions are intended 
to facilitate greater informed choice by consumers:126 these requirements replacing the 
previous “plain and intelligible language” requirement.127 A “transparent” term is one that is in 
plain and intelligible language, and also “legible”. To be “plain and intelligible” a term must 
enable the consumer to “evaluate, on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, the economic 
consequences for him which derive from [the term]’’.128  
    However, the need-based viewpoint is that none of this will have much effect: Consumers 
are unlikely to read standard terms, so “prominent” and “transparent” standard terms, will do 
little to inform them. Even if “prominence” means that charges must be specially highlighted 
in some way (and as discussed below, this is not clear), consumers are assumed generally 
to focus on the essential charges, certainly at least on those that are routinely payable, 
rather than on contingent charges. If they do read about contingent charges, they may find it 
difficult to assess whether the events triggering these charges are likely to occur – possibly 
assuming they will not occur.129 Consumers are therefore unlikely to feel the need to bargain 
for lower charges (if they did, they are unlikely to have the bargaining power/skill to be 
successful), or to make comparisons between different businesses’ charges – so the 
charges will often be subject to very limited competitive discipline.130  
    Consequently, from a need-based perspective, exempting non-essential, especially 
contingent, charges, from the test of unfairness, is likely to result in significant consumer 
detriment. High contingent charges are an increasingly common business model: e.g. bank 
charges, charges for exceeding an airline’s baggage limit, or forgetting to re-fuel a hired 
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car.131 It is rare that consumers make a positive choice to take up the ‘services’ which these 
charges supposedly pay for. The charges usually arise by inadvertence, which, from a need-
based perspective would be understood within a frame of consumer vulnerability, cognitive 
overload and (understandable) human error.132 In addition, the relatively vulnerable financial 
position of most consumers means they have limited ability to absorb the losses caused. 
Through this lens, the CRA sets a low level of consumer protection in relation to the price 
term issue. A more need-based approach might have provided that a charge is only the 
price, if the obligation to pay it is one of the essential terms; or at least that it is not the price 
where it is “contingent” on some later consumer act or omission. Such charges would then 
be subject to the unfairness test, potentially protecting consumers when charges are too 
high, e.g. where they significantly exceed any loss caused to the business, and are not 
necessary to protect some other legitimate business interest.133 This would be much more 
protective than charges simply being validated by the processes of the business, i.e. by 
transparent and prominent presentation. 
    What of our other key question: as to the relationship between the competing ethics and 
legal clarity/certainty? It is true that the test of unfairness involves a degree of uncertainty: 
e.g. in relation to the charges discussed here, there needs to be an assessment of the 
business’ real loss, what legitimate reasons there are for charging more than this, and how 
much the charge needs to be to serve these purposes.134 So, being guided by the need-
based ethic (and applying this test) does compromise certainty to a degree.   
    However, the CRA approach, guided by the self-interest/reliance ethic, generates at least 
as much (if not more) uncertainty as the need-oriented approach. Key here is the 
requirement that a charge escapes the unfairness test if it is “prominent”, i.e. “brought to the 
consumer’s attention in such a way that an average consumer would be aware of the 
term”.135 Yet there is much scope for debate as to what this requires. Must charges be 
highlighted in some way? Must they be separated out from the other terms? If so, is it 
sufficient if they are set out prominently and separately in the formal contract, or must they 
be in other literature, such as advertising, or other communications between the parties? Do 
charges sometimes need to be explained verbally whether by phone, or face to face? Is 
greater prominence required for more unusual or onerous terms?136 Do consumers 
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sometimes need to give separate assent to the charges? In short, the “prominence” concept 
undermines the clarity policy goal by making disputes less predictable.  
    The price term issue is another instance in which the ethic of self-interest/reliance has had 
the strongest influence, the result being very limited consumer protection, and at least as 
much, if not more uncertainty as would have been caused by a need-based approach.   
                                  D Beyond Freedom and Fairness 
The examples in this Part further confirm that the competing ethics framework provides a 
better explanation of consumer contract law than the “freedom versus fairness” framework. 
For example, it was argued above in Section II that “self-interest/reliance” is more 
determinate than “freedom”. This is borne out by the discussion on price terms: The CRA 
approach favours business self-interest by allowing businesses to impose high charges, 
subject only to satisfying process based standards (presenting charges transparently and 
prominently). Consumers must exercise an extremely high degree of self-reliance to protect 
themselves from such charges. This can be referred to also in terms of freedom: the 
business has freedom in what is charged, and the consumer is, at least on paper, free to 
decide whether to agree to such charges. The difficulty is that “freedom” can also be 
understood to mean something similar to the need ethic. On this reading, the argument 
would be that, even if non-essential charges are transparent and prominent, consumers are 
not “free” in any meaningful sense to make use of this information: being unlikely to read 
them, and usually unable to estimate the risks they carry or bargain for their removal. So the 
only route to “real” freedom for consumers is for the law not to define such charges as price 
terms, thereby allowing the fairness test to determine what charges consumers would agree 
to if they were “really” free to bargain, it being imagined that consumers would choose terms 
that are not too substantively harsh. In short, “freedom” can be understood in different 
ways.137 By contrast, the language of self-interest/reliance much more clearly indicates that 
(as under the CRA regime) the preference is actually for process based standards: under 
these standards the business can impose harsh outcomes on consumers, unless consumers 
have exercised a very high degree of self-reliance.  
                                  V. Conclusions and New Research Questions 
This article has looked afresh at consumer contract law theory, developing a “competing 
ethics” framework and arguing that this is an ideal way to depict alternative visions as to 
levels of consumer protection: being more effective in this regard than the “freedom versus 
fairness” framework. The CRA has then been used as a case study to show that a tension 
between the competing ethics runs through the heart of consumer law, and to advance 
understanding as to the relationship between these competing ethics, consumer protection 
and legal clarity/certainty.  
    The issue of certainty/clarity is especially under-researched. This article has sought to 
provide new insights: building on traditional contract law and behavioural science work; and 
making fresh connections between clarity/certainty and the ethical underpinnings of 
consumer law. However, there is more to do on certainty/clarity. Future research should 
consider what consumer law can learn from (and contribute to) philosophical work on the 
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effects of language on human relations, and work on clarity of language in other areas of law 
and regulation such as corporate social responsibility.138  
    As yet, there is no clear pattern of empirical evidence to support or undermine the 
arguments made in this article: it will be important to continue to monitor patterns of 
detriment and dispute resolution, and to consider how any improvements or problems can be 
linked to the arguments made here as to protection, clarity, certainty and the competing 
ethics. In developing areas, e.g. the digital and sharing economies, it will be important to 
recognise the role of competing ethics in influencing choices as to how to balance business 
and consumer interests. For example sharing platforms such as airbnb or Uber would 
normally be thought of as agents who simply bring suppliers (property owners or drivers) and 
consumers together, and who are therefore directly responsible for the quality of what is 
provided. Yet, if policy makers are guided by the need ethic, such platforms should arguably 
be allocated a degree of responsibility: to take into account their powerful economic position, 
their influence over consumer expectations via advertising and marketing, and the fact that 
the actual supplier may not be a regular business that is well placed to provide redress 
where a problem arises.  
    More generally, an important point to emphasise about the ethical underpinnings of 
legislative rules is that government policy documents upon which the CRA was based made 
no explicit reference to any particular ethical positions underpinning the policy thinking. The 
claim of this article rather is that certain ethics are implicit in the approaches taken. Similarly, 
if future developments do not come with explicit reference to ethical allegiances, we will 
need to continue to draw appropriate inferences from the substance of the rules chosen.  
    A further important question is as to how the ethical balance in consumer contract law is 
influenced by stakeholder input. Based on the CRA example, in the case of the need 
oriented rules, there does not appear to have been any major conflict between stakeholders: 
these rules being supported by consumer groups, but there being no pattern of strong 
business resistance.139 It does appear, however, that businesses had some influence where 
choices were made to follow the self-interest/reliance ethic: there being evidence of 
businesses lobbying against introduction of an outcome-based standard for any services, 
and against subjecting more charges to substantive control under the unfairness test.140 
Nevertheless, we should be clear that the stakeholders did not in these instances refer 
explicitly to their allegiance to an ethic of self-interest/reliance. Rather inferences as to this 
allegiance must be drawn from the policy position taken.  
    A further crucial question is as to how the ethical balance of UK consumer law will be 
affected by BREXIT. A very significant proportion of UK consumer law derives from EU law. 
Some of this is in the CRA rules, e.g. the cure remedies in sales contracts, and the unfair 
terms regime; while EU derived rules (e.g. on information and cancellation rights, unfair 
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practices, and producer liability) are contained in other provisions.141 Much of this EU derived 
law has been relatively need-oriented and protective. We saw this with the cure remedies 
discussed above here. In addition, for example, the cancellation rights in distance and off 
premises contracts were new protections for UK consumers; UTCCD required the UK to 
extend control of unfair terms beyond terms excluding or restricting business liabilities, to 
terms imposing onerous obligations and liabilities on consumers;142 the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive (UCPD) required control of a wider range of unfair commercial practices 
than previously in the UK;143 and the Product Liability Directive required the UK to move from 
fault based to strict producer liability for defective products.144 Indeed, the relatively 
protective nature of EU consumer law is further emphasised when we note that these rules 
apply to consumers in general and not only to consumers that are especially vulnerable. In 
fact the UCPD sets an even higher standard of protection for more vulnerable consumers. In 
determining whether a practice is unfair, a key question is whether the practice “…is likely to 
materially distort the economic behaviour … of the average consumer”.145  However, it is 
also provided that practices “likely to materially distort the economic behaviour only of a 
clearly identifiable group of consumers who are particularly vulnerable to the practice or the 
underlying product because of their mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity in a way 
which the trader could reasonably be expected to foresee, shall be assessed from the 
perspective of the average member of that group”.146     
    BREXIT negotiations could result in the UK signing a free trade agreement with the EU 
e.g. as a member of the European Economic Area, meaning that the UK would be required 
to continue to comply with the above Directives.147 Equally some new bespoke trade 
agreement might be reached which requires continued compliance with these Directives.  
    However, assuming the UK does not sign up to a trade agreement requiring compliance 
with these Directives, where might we stand? The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 
provides that “EU-derived domestic legislation … continues to have effect in domestic law on 
and after exit day”.148 However, there remain enormous uncertainties as to what will happen 
to the level of consumer protection. First, the Bill also provides that after exit day, courts are 
not bound by Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) interpretations of these EU derived rules 
and cannot refer issues to the CJEU;149 rather the UKSC would have the final word. Yet, the 
CJEU has often given interpretations of EU consumer law rules that are strongly protective 
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of consumers, and the UKSC has a track record of distinctly non-protective interpretations.150 
Second, after exit day the UK will obviously not be obliged to introduce new EU rules that 
may provide important consumer protections, e.g. rules that may emerge from the current 
review of EU consumer law.151 Third, in relation to those EU rules currently in place, how 
many will the UK government actually chose to retain long term? Repealing significant 
tranches of consumer protection might be considered unacceptable and/or politically unwise. 
Nevertheless, a different view could be taken: a neo liberal, strongly pro-business 
government, with points to prove about ”taking back control” by releasing the country from 
“EU red tape”, might repeal important consumer protections deriving from EU law. Indeed, 
such bad news might be able to be “hidden”, given the enormous menu of Brexit related 
issues that will be on the political agenda over the coming years. Fourth, the UK could enter 
a trade agreement with the US and/or other countries, the terms of which might insist on low 
levels of consumer protection-the idea being that higher levels would impede trade.  
    In short, the BREXIT process could result in UK consumer law taking a radical shift along 
the spectrum to a position where self-interest/reliance is the dominant ethic. This makes the 
analysis here all the more significant, in demonstrating what self-reliance/interest based 
rules look like, and therefore what UK consumer law might look (more) like post BREXIT. 
    Finally, the analysis here is primarily significant in relation to UK consumer law, but it is 
also a relevant case study for law reformers and scholars in other jurisdictions: in terms of 
ideological tensions in consumer law, how these tensions affect consumer protection and 
legal certainty and clarity, and what may be lost by forsaking the European family. 
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